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INFlATION AND  TAXATION WITH OPTIMIZING  GOVERNMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  extends  and  evaluates previous work  on  the positive theory of 
inflation.  We  examine the behavior of  governments concerned solely with 
minimizing  the deadweight loss from raising revenue through inflation and tax 
finance.  We show  that both  governments that can commit to  future policy  actions, 
as  well as those that cannot precommit, will  choose a positive contemporaneous 
association between inflation and the level of  tax burdens.  We examine the 
empirical validity of  this prediction using data  from Britain, France, Germany, 
Japan,  and the United States,  Inflation and tax rates are as likely to be 
negatively  as positively correlated, so the results cast  doubt on the empirical 
relevance of  simple models in  which governments with  time-invariant tastes choose 
monetary policy to  equate the marginal deadweight burdens of  inflation and taxes. 
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Cambrige MA 02139  Cambridge, MA  02139 
(617) 253-6673  (617)  253-8956 A government can satisfy its budget constraint either by  printing money or 
by  levying taxes.  Each  method of  finance has efficiency costs.  Higher inflation 
rates may adversely affect the economy's transaction mechanism and lead to 
inefficiencies in  contracting.  Higher  taxes may distort labor supply, saving, 
and investment deciaions.  Numerous authors1 have examined the optimal inflation 
rate in  the preaence of  tax finance, deacribing the behavior of governmenta 
concerned only with minimizing the deadweight burden of raising a given revenue 
Whether these preacriptiona are conaiatent with actual government behavior ia an 
unresolved and relatively unstudied issue.  Mankiw  (1987) reports a striking 
positive correlation between tax burdens and inflation rates in  the postwar 
United States, a finding consistent with the predictions of  these optimizing 
government models. 
This paper extends and evaluates previous work  on  the interaction  between 
taxes and inflation  First, we  explore whether relaxing the assumption that 
governments can commit to future policies affects the predicted relationship 
between taxes and inflation  Second, we present new empirical evidence on  the 
correlation between inflation and tax burdens in a sample of  OECD countriea.  The 
findings suggest thst optimizing models with  time-invariant tastes cannot explain 
the observed correlations in  most countries.  This means  that other considera- 
tions must be important determinants of  inflation rates.  One possibility is that 
governments choose inflation and tax levels  based on  stabilization objectives 
It is slso possible that the government's dislike for inflation varies over time 
for political or other reasons.  We  discuss these issues in  the conclusion. 
The first part of  the paper examines how the government's ability to commit 
affects its inflation and tax choices.  Calvo (1978) shows that the optimal 
'Previous studies of the choice between inflation and taxation include 
Phelps (1973), Calvo (1978), Orazen (1979),  Helpman and Sadka (1979), Kimbrnugh 
(1986), Lucas (1986),  and Romer  (1987). -2- 
inflationary policy  when  the government can commit to  future  inflation rates  is 
different from  that when it cannot.  In his model,  unanticipated  inflation is 
more attractive  ax  post than anticipated inflation.  Unanticipated  inflation is 
at least in  part  a "taking," with  the government expropriating  consumers' wealth 
by  reducing the value  of real  money balances.  Anticipated  inflation, on  the 
other hand, also distorts behavior by  leading consumers to  economize on real 
money balances. 
Since models with  commitment lead to the first best  level of  inflation, 
optimizing  governments will try to bind themselves when  possible.  The commitcent 
case appears implausible on a  priori grounds, however.  We know  of  no examples in 
which monetary  policy  is regulated by  law, much less by an  irrevocable  monetary 
constitution.  Commitment,  if it  exists, must  therefore be enforced by zeputa- 
tional considerations.  Existing models in  this spirit2 rely on  the ability of 
consumers  to change  their behavior  if the government deviates from  the reputa- 
tional equilibrium, a discipline that will only operate  if households can 
identify government deviations  from equilibrium strategies.  Such identification 
may however be  extremely  difficult in practice if  the reputational equilibrium 
involves the kind  of fluctuations in  monetary policy  that we  regularly observe. 
Models  without commitment have  a separate difficulty.  Without cormitment, 
the government  at  each point  in time may view increases  in the price  level as a 
lump aum tax.  Inflation  is therefore a  least-cost  instrument for raising 
revenue,  so other  taxes would not be  used.  We  believe models with  this charac- 
teristic take an  overly simplistic view of  the government's preferences,  and we 
follow  Bohn (1987) in  assuming that the government perceives even  unanticipated 
2Rogoff  (1987) surveys the recent literature on  reputational models in 
macroeconomics. -3- 
inflation  as  costly. 
Models with  and  without commitment  imply a  positive relationship between the 
inflation rate and tax rates.  In  both cases, the marginal social cost of  raising 
additional  revenue with the inflation tax is an  increasing function of  the 
inflation rate.  The marginal deadweight burden  of tax finance also rises with 
the tax rate.  An  optimizing government which equates the marginal  social costs 
of  obtaining  revenue from inflation and taxation  will therefore raisa both the 
inflation  rate and tax rates in  response to  higher  revenue demands. 
Although  it  has no  bearing on  the prediction of a  positive correlation 
between  inflation and tax rates, resolving whether governments can  precommit  to 
monetary policy  is of central importance for evaluating the welfare effects of 
inflation.  On  dimensions other than  the contemporaneous correlation  between  tax 
rates  and inflation, the possibility  of committment affects the predictions  of 
optimizing  models,  We focus on  one such difference.  Unanticipated  inflation 
reduces the value of  outstanding nominal government debt.  A government  that 
cannot  restrict  its future actions will  therefore find  it more attractive  to 
inflate when the stock of  outstanding nominal debt is large.  This temptation 
does not arise for a government that has committed to future policies,  so the 
correlation  between the debt stock and inflation may prove useful  in  distinguish- 
ing models  with and without commitment.  Unfortunately we also show  that if the 
government  can tax outstanding  government debt without resorting to the inflation 
tax, then  the correlation of  inflation with  various measures of  nominal liabilit- 
ies does  not depend on  the possibility of  commitment. 
Readers who pay serious attention  to the actual pronouncements  of  policy 
makers  may believe that revenue considerations  have no  place in  a positive  theory 
of monetary  policy.  Central bankers rarely, if ever, mention the seigniorage -4- 
that results from alternative monetary policies.  While we view this as evidence 
against the class of  optimizing models studied below, and this skepticism  is con- 
firmed  by our empirical findings, it might nevertheless be  possible  to reconcile 
the actual speeches of  policy-makers with  the optimizing  government models.  When 
government  spending is high  governments tend to raise taxes and also to increase 
debt finance.  Central bankers who react by  purchasing government  bonds with 
newly minted  money,  thereby raising seigniorage revenues, may rationalize  this 
behavior with  feat of high interest rates generated by large government  debt 
scocks.  Theic behavior may however be consistent with the predictions of 
positive models of  government based on  deadweight burden  minimization. 
Our analysis of  inflation and taxation is divided into two parts,  The first 
part, which consists of sections 1 through III, develops the theory while  the 
second  part  presents the empirical  tests.  Section 1 considers  the classic case 
of inflation and tax choice when  the government is able to  commit.  Section II 
assumes instead that committmenc  is impossible and that the government  is unable 
to tax govecnment bonds directly.  The third section introduces bond  taxation in 
a model without commirrent and shows its implications are similar to those of the 
commitment  case.  Section IV  studies the empirical relationship between taxes and 
inflation in  the U.S., U.K., Japan, West Germany and France.  We show that a 
positive association between inflation and the level of  tax burdens  obtains only 
in the U.S. and  Japanese data;  a negative relationship emerges  in  the other 
three countries.  We therefore conclude that simple positive models of  government 
behavior such  as those analyzed here are incapable of  explaining  monetary and 
3Our  analysis only  applies if the central government  and the central bank 
are actually cooperating. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) present a model  in which 
these arms of  government behave noncooperatively. -5. 
fiscal policy. 
I,  Inflation  and Taxation with Precommittment 
This section models  an  optimizing government's choice of  inflation and tax 
rates when  committment  is possible and when these policies are chosen  only with 
regard to  their  revenue effects.  The government's objective  is to minimize  the 
total cost of raising revenue, given by 
W(t)  E  Z  p  k[h(e+.) 
- v()1. 
j—O  t+j 
The parameter  p is a discount factor, 9  represents the ratio of taxes to  income 
in  period t, and P  is the price level at  t.  We  assume that k( )  is a monotone 
increasing  function while h(  ),  the  tax distortion,  is increasing and convex. 
The increasing and concave function v( ) gives the benefits  from deflation 
so that the costs of inflation are -v(  )  -  This  function is not just intended to 
capture the distortionary  effects of inflation on  the demand for money, as in the 
work  of  Drazen  (1979), Phelps  (1973),  Kimbrough  (1986) and Lucas  (1986). 
Instead,  it reflects  the many  possible consequences of  inflation enumerated  by 
Fischer and Modigliani  (l978).  In particular,  the government might be  concerned 
with  the distributional  consequences of inflation as well  as with  the difficul- 
ties inflation  introduces in  a world with  pervasive nominal contracts.  The 
specification  of inflation's cost in (I)  is therefore more general than that 
which would  emerge from  explicit analysis of a representative  consumer economy. 
The government's budget constraint is described by the evolution of real 
4Because we consider relatively many  effects of  inflation,  there is no 
presumption,  as in the more narrow models of  Kimbrough  (1986) or  Faig (1987), 
that the optimal tax rate on  money is given by the Friedman  rule.  This presump- 
tion actually  disappears as soon as  money services are not viewed  as  perfect 
substitutes  for other arguments in  the utility function (see Romer (1987)). -6- 
government debt, b: 
P 
(2)  b  [b1(l+i1) + m1] ? 
+  -  -  m 
where m g,, and y  denote  real money balances, real government  spending, and 
real income respectively.  The nominal interest rate is i.  We treat government 
spending as exogenous,  but real income depends on the tax rate.  Real money 
balances and the nominal interest rate at  t depend on anticipated  inflation 
between t and t+l.  Real money balances could also depend  on income and taxes 
without altering our substantive conclusions, although for simplicity we ignore 
these effects through most  of  our analysis. 
Commitment can  be  aodeiled by  allowing the government,  which maximizes  (I) 
subject to (2) at time  t,  to pick a contingency plan for tax rates and prices st 
t+l.  This plan, which allows taxes and inflation to depend  on  the realizations 
of  all tel variables  including  and  is chosen before households  choose 
their money holdings.  Thus real money demand and interest rates are determined 
after the government  chooses the next period's taxes and inflation.  Allowing the 
government  to choose  a contingency  path for prices is only an  expository  device, 
It is equivalent to  having  the government pick  the contingent path for the money 
supply  in all future periods. 
When  the government  at t chooses taxes and inflation for period  t+l. it must 
take as given the end-of-period  stock of government liabilities, b, + m.  This 
is  the only state variable for the government's problem:  tax and inflation 
choices beyond period  t are affected by  the past only  through b, +  m,.  The 
division of  these liabilities between money and bonds, however,  depends on  the 
government's decisions  in period  t.  Beosuse the stock of  liabilities  is the only -7- 
state variable  for the governments  problem, it  is the sole  channel through which 
policy choices in period  t affect future values of  money demand, prices, and 
output.  Holding constant  the end-of-period stock of  liabilities  (b 
+ 
altering inflation between periods t and t+l and taxes in period  t+l only affect 
interest rates and real money demand  in period t  and output  in period  t+l 
These  shifts leave the path  of government revenue unchanged,  so at the optimum 
they cannot affect the government's welfare,  Small revenue-neutral  changes in 
the tax-inflation mix therefore do  not affect the total cost of  raising revenue. 
This indifference can be formalized as follows.  From  equation  (2) we can 
find the derivative  change  in the tax rate e+1  that  raises  enough revenue to 
offaet  a change  in  holding constant the level of government liabilities 
at the end of  period  t+l.  This is the period  t budget  constraint  facing a 
government in period  t that  can commit to actions for t+l: 
d[(b+m)(l+i)(Pt/Pt+i)J  d[im(P/P+1fl 
(3) y  1(l+e9)d 
=  -  ______________ }  do 
d(P/P+i)  d(P/P,÷1) 
where  is the elasticity  of  income with  respect to  taxes.  If  the real return 
(l+it)Pt/Pt+l equals a constant  (R),  then since b 
÷ 
rn 
is taken as given by 
previous government actions, the first term on the right hand side is zero.  The 
constancy of  the real return  implies that the expression being  differentiated  in 
the second  term can be  rewritten  [(P/P÷i)RJm 





-  tt÷l 
d(P 
dot) 
t  t-+-l  t+l 
The second term in brackets  can be transformed into an  expression  depending on 
5lnflation  in  period  t+l is defined as  the change  in the price  level between 
t and t÷l. -8- 
the elasticity  of  money  demand with respect to the nominal interest rate, m.: 
(4')  - 
m(l+mAd(P/P1). 
The government  faces this constraint  in minimizing the social  losses defined by 
equation  (I).  The first order condition for this problem  is: 
h'(01)m(l+m.) 
(5 
(1+  )  '  r+l  1t÷l  Eg 
-l  where  (-v')  , '  <  0.  This expression equates the excess burden per unit 
revenue for each  revenue source. 
Equation  (5)  links the equilibrium level of  inflation to  the tax rate for 
given values of income and real money balances.  It states that positive shocks 
to  government  spending that raise taxes and their associated excess burden  should 
be accompanied by increases in  inflation that raise the marginal excess burden 
from  seigniorage.  It  also states that inflation between t and t+l should be an 
increasing  function of m/y1.  When  this ratio is large,  the revenue from  a 
given inflation rate is high  since, with commitment,  revenue from inflation is 
obtained at  t+l as people replenish the money that has been  depleted by infla- 
tion.  The more money  they carry over, the larger these replenishments  must be 
and the lower the relative cost  of  inflstion.6 
II.  Inflation and  Tax Policy without Committment or Bond  Taxes 
We now consider the government's choice of  inflation and tax rates when 
committment  is impossible.  This implies that the government  in  period t can only 
tIt might be thought that this effect  is offset by  the fact that inflation 
is more  costly  when money holdings are higher.  While  this might be true when the 
only  costs of inflation ate the distortions in money holdings  it is unlikely  to 
be true for other costs of  inflation. -9- 
choose  the tax rate  and the price level at  t.  Although it can cause unexpected 
inflation, if there were no exogenous uncertainty the government's problem at  t 
would  be  known at  t-l so  there would  be no  unexpected inflation  in  equilibrium. 
The equilibrium  inflation rate is just that rate at which  the government will  not 
choose  to induce any unexpected  inflation.7 
We  begin by  maintaining  comparability with the previous section so  that the 
objective function remains  (1)  while the budget constraint  is  (2).  It is 
important to  stress that without commitment inflation will only  be finite if  it 
remains costly so that the function v( )  does  not become degenerate.  Without 
commitment,  some might argue  that the costs of  inflation are much  lower.  One of 
the costs of  expected inflation, the increase in  transaction costs due to 
economizing on  money holdings at  t-l, is immaterial for governments who cannot 
precommit  since the government  that picks the price level at t cannot  alter the 
choice  of  money holdings at  t.l,  Many  other costs nevertheless  remain even  when 
inflation  is unanticipated.  These costs can be of  two kinds.  First, the 
government may  be  averse  to redistributing wealth between debtors and creditors. 
Reestablishing  the original distribution of  wealth may require the use of 
distortionary taxes and subsidies.  Second. even  unanticipated  inflation nay 
distort subsequent behavior by  households and firms in ways the government finds 
undesirable.  For example, workers may press for premature renegotiation of their 
contracts,  firms may  incur additional costs of  changing prices  and individuals 
may be  forced to engage in  additional financial transactions  to restore their 
liquidity.  Indeed, insofar the costs of  inflation are due to  its deleterious 
effects on  nominal contracts, unexpected  inflation may be more costly than 
7The structure of this model resembles that of Barro and Gordon  (1983) 
although  they do not consider the revenue created by inflation. -  10  - 
anticipated inflation because it has not been  reflected in  contracts. 
In the absence of  commitment,  the only  state variable when  taxes and the 
price  level at t are chosen  is the total beginning  of  period level of liabil- 
ities,  + ThtF  The government at t then chooses both  the tax 
rate and nominal money balances at  t.  These choices determine interest rates and 
the price level.  As in  the previous section the analysis is unchanged  if the 
government  is thought of  as picking the price  level with  interest rates and  money 
demand responding  to the choices of  and  Of  course, i  and m  depend on 
expectations  at t of  government actions at  t+1.  Since these actions in turn 
depend on 
(1+it)b and  and mt  can only  depend on  b.  Any tax-inflation 
switch that does not change b  therefore will  not affect future real money 
balances  or nominal  interest rates. 
At  the policy  optimum, the government must  be indifferent to  small perturba- 
tions in the policy  mix  which  leave b  unchanged.  Without commitment,  the 
tradeoff between inflation and taxes that do  not alter beginning of  period 
government  liabilities  is: 
(6)  y(l+E)d 
- .e d(P1/P). 
This  differs from  the tradeoff in  the commitment  case because it  excludes  the 
response of  money demand and nominal interest rates to expected inflation. 
Maximizing  (1) subject to (6)  gives a first order condition for the no  commitment 
case: 
P  h'(O  )[m  + b  (l+i  )i 
(7)  t  t-  t-l  t-l 
Pt 
Equation (7) indicates that inflation is a  positive  function of  both taxes 
and total government  liabilities as  a share of  GNP.  The positive link to taxes 
results because when  high  deadweight burdens are being  imposed with  the tax -  11  - 
instrument,  higher  inflation taxes will also be appropriate.  The poaitive effect 
of outstanding  liabilities obtains because governments with large nominal 
obligations  will find inflation more attractive than  those with  less heavy debt 
burdens, since  inflation erodes  the value of these obligations.8 
The inflationary erosion of  government liabilities is  totally anticipated, 
at least in  models without stochastic disturbances.  It  is nevertheless possible 
for governments  to accumulate stocks of  such obligations, provided  they are 
willing  to pay sufficiently high  nominal yields.  It is even  possible for 
inflation  to raise no  revenue:  the revenue raised ex nos  from reducing the 
value of  bonds and money may be  more than offset ex  ante by increases in  nominal 
interest rates and reductions in  the demand for real money  balances. 
Since we  are analyzing the time inconsistent solution to the government'a 
optimization problem, inflation is generally suboptimal.  For considering whether 
government  policy is in some ex  ante sense optimal, it is important to  distin- 
guish empirically  between the commitment and the no  commitment  solutions.  Thia 
is  possible  since the first order conditions for optimal inflation choice in 
economies with and without credible committment are different.  While with 
commitment  the stock of  money balances influences inflation choices, the total 
stock of  nominal government  obligations  (including nominal bonds)  plays a sirilar 
role in  the absence of  commitment. 
III.  Inflation and Tax Policy: No  Committment. with Taxes  on  Bonds 
The previous  section provides one channel for distinguishing  the commitment 
8This raises the question of why governments choose  to issue nominal 
liabilities.  Bohn (1987) provides one possible explanation  for this puzzle. -  12 
and  no-commitment  cases.  This  Section  ShOws  that  this  approach  is  sensitive  to 
the  menu  of  taxes available to the government.  The level of  nominal bonds 
affects inflation  in the previous section's model because  inflation is the only 
way to  tax these bonds.  We now consider a model in  which  the government can also 
levy direct  taxes on  government bonds,  and show that  it  is much  more  difficult  to 
distinguish between  scenarios with  and without commitment. 
If the government can tax government bonds at  rate r, real debt  evolves as: 
(8)  bt 
=  [b1(l+i1)z 
+  +  g 
-  5y 
-  m. 
where  z  1 - r  The  existence of  r  does not affect  the results in  the  t  t  t 
commitment case, since if a  modification of  the bond  tax is known  in  advance, 
nominal  interest rates will adjust to keep after-tax returns constant. 
Without commitment, however, a government would  not use distortionary  taxes 
if  increasing  direct taxes on  government bonds were  possible and if such taxes 
were  perceived  to be  costless.  To explain the existence of  other taxes and 
inflation,  direct bond  expropriations must  therefore be  perceived  as costly.9  We 
thus assume  that the government now maximizes: 
(9)  W(t) —  E  p3 kih(9.) 
- v(1) 
- 
j=O  t-i-j  t+j 
where  f( ), which is  increasing and concave, represents  the government's utility 
from repaying  its debt.  In  this no-commitment scenario, the state variables  that 
affect the government's choices in  period t are the level of  real debt obliga- 
tions, bi(l+i1), 
and the level of past  money  balances, md. 
9One  possible cost  is the redistribution associated with  bond taxation. 
Rotemberg  (1987) explores a model in  which the government  cares directly  for the 
welfare  of  the bondholders. -  13  - 
By  the argument in  the previous section, money  demand as well as interest 
rates at t depend  only on  the level of  bonds and not on  the revenue mix  between 
taxes and inflation.  The government at  t must  therefore be  indifferent to  small 
changes in the composition of  revenue which leave b 
unaffected.  The same 
approach to analyzing optimal choices that  we followed above then yields  first 
order conditions  equating  the marginal cost of income tax finance with that from 
inflation and bond taxation: 
_______  y(l + 
(10)  h'(G)  v'(  ,  )  t  c-I 
b  (l+i  )z P  t-l  t-l  t  t-l 
(11)  h'(9)  f'(  )  y(l  + 
e9). 
Equation  (10) describes  equilibrium inflation as a function of  real money 
balances,  income, and the tax rate.  It differs from the first order condition 
without commitment  only in  the absence of  art m. term)0  Although the two first 
order conditions  are empirically  indistinguishable,  it is plausible that infla- 
tion will  be lower under (5).  Regardless of  whether  the government can precom- 
mit, inflation  raises revenue because individuals  need more printed money  to 
retain their real money balances.  Commitment  dampens this effect because  the 
government  realizes  that raising expected inflation reduces desired real money 
balances.  Without commitment  the current government  cannot affect future 
inflation,  so raising prices appears to  have a less deleterious effect on 
government revenue.  This  is only an illusion.  Without commitment inflation 
tends  to be higher,  reducing earlier governments' revenue from money creation. 
10The elasticity of money  demand with  respect to  expected price changes, m. 
will be treated as constant  in what  follows.  As  Mankiw  (1987)  notes, treating 
1 
this  elasticity  as  depending on  inflation would  not affect the analysis. This 
dependence would  be confounded with  the dependence  of  v'  on  inflation. -  14  - 
Past  revenue losses are however ignored by  the current government, so  inflation 
is a  more  attractive  revenue source for governments  that cannot precommit  than 
for those  that can. 
Since equation  (5) is so similar to (10) the relationship between  taxes and 
inflation cannot  really be used  to test for the presence of  commitment.  This 
does not imply that it is impossible to  distinguish  the commitment  case from the 
no-commitment  scenario  since the two may yield different predictions  along other 
dimensions.  For example, the two cases differ in  their implications  for the 
intertemporal behavior of  tax rates,  An  optimizing government  that is able to 
commit must  be indifferent between the actual path  of taxes and an alternative 
path  which raises one additional dollar of  revenue today and one less dollar  (in 
present value  terms) tomorrow,  Barro  (1979)  has shown this implies that tax 
rates must  follow a martingale: 
(12)  h'(O) 
= 
PEtRh'(Ot+1). 
In  the appendix, we derive the analogous relationship without commitment: 
(13)  h'(9)  PEt[R 
+ (R  - P/P1)(dm/dO)Jh'(91). 
Equation  (13) shows that the expected tax rate change  is related to expected 
inflation.  The sign of  this relationship, however, will depend upon  the second 
derivatives of  money demand with respect to inflation and taxes. 
IV.  The Empirical Relationship between Inflation and  Taxes 
This  section evaluates the models of  the previous sections in  light of the 
relationship between taxes and inflation in  several nations and over  several time 
periods.  We  first consider the empirical counterpart of  equation  (5),  which  is -  15  - 
valid  with  bond taxation regardless of  whether the government  can commit and 
without bond  taxation provided the government can precommit.U  Mankiw  (1987) 
estimates an  equation similar to this on  post-war U.S. data.  We also estimate 
the empirical counterpart of (7), the first order condition  that holds with 
neither commitment  nor bond taxation.  Although inflation and the level of 
taxation have moved  together during the last century in  the United  States, 
evidence from  other nations yields very  little support  for the view  of government 
behavior analyzed above. 
To  estimate  the first order condition implied by government  optimization, we 
must specify functional  forms for h(  )  and v(  ),  the  deadweight  losses due to 
taxation and inflation resecttvely.  We assume constant  elasticity functions so 
that our objective function  is a generalization of the CES welfare function: 
h(9) — zl(8t)m 
and v(Pi/P)  z2(Pi/P)1 
for Zl z2, 
a and $ positive 
constants.  This implies that (5)  can be written as 




11  a/$ and  12 
= l/$.  This specification relaxes Mankiw's  (1987) assump- 
tion that the ratio of a1  to  is constant. 
If the functions h(  )  and v(  )  were  literally time invariant and correctly 
specified,  equation (14) would hold  without error.  This literal version of our 
model is easy to reject.  We are not, however, interested in testing the proposi- 
tion that the theory can explain the exact relationship between  taxes and 
inflation, but in exploring whether the theory can explain a substantial fraction 
11Under our assumption  that the Fisher hypothesis holds,  the empirical 
results do  not depend on  whether inflation or  the nominal interest rate is used 
as the dependent variable.  Mankiw  (1987) found similar results in  the United 
States time series using both  dependent variables. -  16  - 
of the movements  in  these series.  We  rherefore test the prediction  that higher 
taxes tend to be  associated with  higher inflation by simply  adding an  ertor term, 
to (14) and estimating  the resulting equation for several countries. 
Our estimation employs annual data for five countries:  the United  States, 
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan.  Taxes and gross national product are flows 
during the calendar year.  Our analysis is confined to taxes levied by  the 
central government,  since this is the level of  government choosing monetary 
policy.  Price indices, measured using consumer prices  in each  country, are 
annual average values.  The stocks of  money and debt are measured as  mid-year 
values  or yearly  averages.  Since both inflation and the tax rate are highly 
persistent,  ordinary least squares estimation of (14) would  recover the trends  in 
the two aeries.  We therefore add a time trend to (14) and estimate  the resulting 
equation allowing for residual autocorrelation, or we  difference  (14) and 
estimate the resulting specification by  ordinary least squares. 
We  begin by  analyzing the time series evidence for the United  States, using 
two measures of  the tax rate  The first is the ratio of  federal government 
tax receipts to GNP.  If the government chooses its mix of  tax instruments 
optimally,  then the level of  taxes divided by ONP is a summary statistic  for the 
degree of  tax distortion.  Ir  also avoids the problem of  computing  the marginal 
deadweight loss of  particular  tax instruments taking account of the interactions 
between tax instruments and of  the other pre-exiscing distortions, and it is 
available for a long time period.  The second measure of  the tax burden  is the 
weighted  average marginal  tax rate on  labor income computed by Barro and Sahasa- 
kul (1986).  Their tax measure, including both  federal income and Social  Security 
taxes, is available  for the 1916-1985 period.  Data  limitations  restricted  our -  17  - 
sample period  to  begin in  1890, even  when  we  use T/GNP for our tax measure.12 
The results of estimating  equation (14) for a variety of  different  sample 
periods are shown Table  1.  The tax rate is positively correlated  with  the 
inflation rate for all of  the sample periods, but the strength of  this correla- 
tion is  strongest  for the post-World War II period.  For the entire  1891-1986 
period, a ten percentage  point increase in the share of  taxes in  GNP predicts a 
one half of one percentage point  increase in the inflation rate.  The tax rate 
and trend, however, explain less than  six percent of  the variation  in  inflation 
rates.  The estimates in the AR(l) with trend and the differenced  equations  are 
similar, with slightly larger effects of the tax rate on  inflation  in  the latter 
equations.  For the period since  1919 but excluding World War II, the coefficient 
estimates are close to  those for the full sample, although now the null  hypothe- 
sis of no tax effect  on inflation cannot be rejected at  standard levels. 
This conclusion  is reversed when the sample is restricted  to the post-war 
period.  A  ten percent of  GNP increase in  taxes now raises the inflation rate by 
approximately  3.4 percent, and the impact coefficient is estimated much  more 
precisely  than for the longer  sample periods.  When the Barro-Sahasakul  marginal 
tax rate series is  used in place of the tax-to-GNP ratio,  the estimated  inflation 
effect of a tax increase is  smaller.  A ten percentage point  rise in  the marginal 
tax rate raises  the inflation rate by  just under two percentage  points. 
The coefficient on log(m1/y)  in the full sample equations  in  Table  1  is 
12The Consumer Price Index for the United  States is reported in  Historical 
Statistics  of  the United States, and was updated using the Economic Report  of the 
President.  The money  stock is the stock of  high  powered money,  reported in 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982, Table  4.8).  The interest rate is the nominal call 
money rate, again as  reported in  Friedman and Schwartz with  updates by the 
atthors.  Government debt is measured  as the publicly-held  stock of government 
debt on  July 1 of  each year,  as reported in Federal Reserve Board, Banking and 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 negative, although the null hypothesia that it is zero cannot be rejected at 
atandatd confidence levels.  Since the coefficient on  this variable is 1/fl,  the 
negative estimate is inconsistent with the theory underlying equation (14).  The 
negative parameter estimates are apparently due to the pre-wsr sample since the 
estimates for the post-World War II period suggest a positive effect of  the 
money-to-income  ratio on  the inflation rate. The same coefficient pattetn, 
negative in longer sarpies and positive for the postwar period, emerges in bnth 
the AR(l) and the differenced estimates. 
Mankiw  (1987) excludes the m1/y 
vsrisble.  He  justifies this exclusion 
by  assuming both  that the quantity equation holds, so  that m/y 
is constant, and 
that observations are sufficiently close together (as  they ste in his continuous- 
time theoretical model) so  that the difference between m  and m1  can be 
ignored.  To  verify  that our results are not due to our inclusion of log(m 
we also  estimated a modified version of (14) excluding this variable. 
Table 2 reports these equations for the same sample periods as Table 1.  The 
estimated coefficients on the tax rare variable decline slightly, and the 
standard errors  increase.  The overall conclusions about the links between tax 
rates and inflation are nor affected by this change in specification. 
Our findings for the United Stares strengthen Mankiw's (1987) conclusions 
based on  postwar period  To  evaluate the robustness of  the positive relationship 
between inflation and tax rates, however, we  now consider data from  four addi- 
tional countries.  For France, Germany, snd Japan, we  draw data from the Interna- 
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construct  tax-to-GNP ratios and inflation rates)'3  More extensive data are 
available for Britain.  For the period 1872-1985, we  constructed  a tax-to-GNP 
ratio using data  from British Historical Statistics and various issues of  the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics.  The annual price index was measured using the 
Retail Price Index (post.l948) and the Statist price index)'4 
Tables  3 and  4 report estimates of (14),  with and without mi/y for 
these four countries.  The positive association between inflation and taxes  -hat 
appears in  U.S. data does not generalize.  The French and British data show a 
statistically  ignificant and negtiye relationship between tax levels and the 
inflation rate.  In  Germany the relation is again negative although the standard 
error of  the estimated coefficient is too large to reject the null hypothesis  of 
no  tax effect,  Only the Japanese data  confirm the U.S. finding of a positive 
relationship between inflation and taxes.  A ten percent of  GNP increase in the 
tax burden  is estimated to increase the inflation rate by  3.1 percent in the 
AR(1) specification,  and by 4,7 percent in the differenced equation.  The 
estimated effects of log(m1/y1)  on inflation are positive in  each equation in 
Table 3,  in contrast to the often negative coefficients for the United States. 
'3Data on  annual averages of  consumer price indexes, as well  as reserve 
money, government debt outstanding, gross domestic product, and call money 
interest rates, were drawn from the IFS.  In  some cases these series were splice 
together using values  from several different IFS publications and domestic 
statistical  sources,  The tax receipts of the central government are reported in 
the UN  National Accounts. 
'4Interest rates and the stock of  high  powered money are drawn from Friedira' 
and Schwartz (1983,  Table 4,9).  The stock of government debt is drawn from 
British Historical  Statistics, Table Public Finance 3, updated using the Anncal 
Abstract of  Statistics.  Implicit in our use of  data from the gold standard is 
the notion  that seigniorage  is available even  when  dollars are measured in terms 
of a commodity.  Seigniorage is possible as long as the gold  stock held  by the 
government  doesn't bear any relation to government minted currency.  Of course, 
the gold standard might be  viewed as providing a commitment to prices so  that 
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When  the  inflation-tax  intetaction  is  estimated  using  a  specification 
exoluding  log(m1/y) as in Table 4,  France and Britain continue to ahow 
statistically significant negative coefficienta on the tax variable.  For 
Britain, the absolute size of the tax coefficient declines substantially in  the 
AR(l) specification although not in  the differenced  specification.  For Japan, 
the tax variable baa an even stronger poaitive association  wirh inflation when  we 
exclude the money-to-income  rati  Finally, the coefficient on the tax share for 
Germany moves  from negative in  the equation with  ln(m1/y) 
to positive withbut 
this variable, but the coefficient  is never statistically  significant. 
The failure of the estimates of  equation (14)  to  reflect positive associa- 
tion between tax rates and inflation might he due to an  incorrect apecification. 
We have asaumed that  governments can either precommit,  or that if  they cannot, 
that they  can tax outstanding government debt without resorting to  inflarion.  If 
these assumptions  are incorrect, the appropriate first-order condition linking 
taxes and inflation ratea  ia equation (7),  which includes the government's 
outstanding interest bearing debt.  Under the same parametric  aaaumptiona used  to 
derive  (14)  from  (5), the version of (7)  that we estimate is: 
(15)  ln(F/F11)  m + l  ln(e) +  2 ln((b1(l+c1) 
+ m1)/y] 
+ 
Since  the earlier results auggeat that differencing and autoregreaaive correc- 
tions with  time trends yield similar results, we present only  the latter. 
Table 5 reports estimates of (15)  for all five countries in  our sample.  The 
inclusion of the broad  government liabilities variable does not substantively 
alter our estimates of the aaaociation between taxes and inflation.  In  par- 
ticular, the coefficient on  the tax rare remains negative and statistically 




Measure  Constant  Tax Rate 
Government 
Liabilities  Trend  a 
2 
France  T/GNF  .778  - .770  .259  .0185  .709  .643 
1948-85  (.180)  (.119)  (.099)  (.0043) (.119) 
Germany  T/GNP  -.0024  037  - .029  .0012  .530  .043 
1954-84  (.1410)  (.108)  (.028)  (.0013) (.167) 
Japan  T/GNP  1.178  .841  - .167  - .063  .477  .352 
1957-83  (.346)  (.222)  (.043)  (.003)  (.185) 
U.K.  T/GNP  -1.335  - .479  .693  .0085  .976  .669 
1872-1984  (.317)  (.060)  (.049)  (.0034) (.016) 
U.S.  T/GNP  .201  .074  - .055  - .0001  .513  .115 
1891-1985  (.082)  (.024)  (.019)  (.0007) (.089) 
U.S.  KTR  .311  .184  .063  -.0003  .678  .228 
1946-85  (.186)  (.062)  (.043)  (.0020) (.121) 
U.S.  T/GNP  .414  .288  .071  .0022  .700  .301 
1946-1985  (.184)  (.079)  (.042)  (.0017) (.119) 
Estimates 
standard 
correspond to  equation 
errors, 
(15) in the text.  Values in  parentheses  are -  21 
- 
United  States, and statistically insignificant for Germany  The broad liability 
measure is less correlated with  inflation than the log(m1/y) variable that 
appeared in Table 3.  This is reflected in lower B2 values, as well  as lower t- 
ststistics.  The point estimstes for the liability variable are negative  (i.e., 
incorrectly signed) for Germany and Japen, whereas the money-to-ON? ratio hsd the 
sign predicted by  the foregoing theory. 
The superiority of  models  including only the ratio of  money  to ON?, relative 
to models with  total government liabilities as a abate of  ON?, can  be demonatat- 
ed  by estimating tegteseion equations which include kth  variables.  Thia is 
equivalent to  the non-nested hypothesia teat  of  the null hypothesis that one 
variable affects the inflation tate against the alternative  that the other 
variable affects  it.  For the U.S., Germany, and Japan,  including both  variables 
yields a negstive coefficient on  the liability variable but a positive and 
usually statistically significant coefficient on  the money variable.  For France 
both variables have positive but statistically insignificant coefficients, while 
for Britain both  are positive and statistically significant, but the coefficient 
on  money  ia roughly three times as large as that on  the broader liability 
measure.  Overall, the results are more aupportive of a specification including 
the ratio of  lagged money to ON? than the total level of  government liabilities. 
The final empirical  issue we  address concerns the links between intertem- 
poral changes in tax rates and other government choices, notably inflation.  In 
the last section we showed that with  commitment the tax rate should  evolve as a 
martingale, while  in the nc commitment case future tax rates should be  partially 
predictable using  lagged inflation rates.  We  explore this question by  estimating 
simple regression models relating the change  in the tax-to-ON? ratio between 
periods t-l and t to the inflation rate in  period  t-l: -  22  - 
(16) 
-  —  + i 
+ 
Table 6 presents estimates of  equation (16).  In  four of the five nations, 
high inflation predicts an  increase in the level of  taxation.  In the U.S. and 
France a one percent increase in  the inflation rate predicts an  increase of 
approximately one half  of  one percent in the tax-to-GNP ratio.  The finding for 
France  is  statistically significant  at conventional levels, while in  the U.S. th 
null hypothesis  that inflation cannot  forecast tax changes would  be  rejected at 
the 10 percent level.  In  Britain and Germany each percentage point of inflation 
predicts higher  taxes of  approximately one quarter of one percent of CNP, with 
the British results rejecting  the null hypothesis of no  effects at high  con- 
fidence levels.  Finally, in Japan, there is a  negative but imprecisely estimate 
relationship between the inflation rate and the change in  tax burdens.  These 
findings are potentially  interesting because provide evidence against the 
martingale  models of  taxation developed by  Barro (1979) and  others,15  and 
because they provide weak  evidence against the assumption that governments can 
precommit to  future actions. 
V.  Conclusions 
The view that taxes and inflation are chosen by  deadweight-loss minimizing 
governments, using both instruments to raise revenue, cannot  explain our finding 
that higher  taxes are just as often associated with  lower as with  higher  infla- 
tion.  Several explanations may be advanced to  account for our results,  One 
15Sahasakul  (1987)  presents other evidence for the U.S. contradicting the 
unpredictability  of  tax rate changes.  He shows that tax rates respond to 
transitory  increases in  spending by  more than can be  justified by optimizing 
models with  infinite-lived governments. Table 6:  Inflation as a Predictor of  Tax Rate Chanmes 
Country!  Tax Rate  Lagged  2  Measure  Constant  Inflation 
France  T/GNP 
- .022  .587  .135  .593 
1947-1984  <.108)  (.082)  (.170) 
Germany  T/GNF  .000  .242  - .029  .068 
1953-1984  (.006)  (.164)  (.181) 
Japan  T/CNP  .017  - .015  - .076  .009 
1956-1984  (.009)  (.133)  (.191) 
U.K.  T/GNP  .006  .274  .076  .073 
1872-1985  (.010)  (.093)  (.094) 
U.S.  T/GNP  .0051  .537  .281  .032 
1891-1986  (.0194)  (.302)  (.099> 
Estimates correspond to equation  (16)  in the text.  Standard errors are report. 
ed in  parentheses. -  23  - 
possibility,  which begs the question of  what objectives guide monetary policy, is 
that inflation is determined without regard to government  revenua needs. 
Inflation might be chosen  to stabilize GNP, for example.  Even though  traditional 
Keynesian  presciptions for stabilization policy would call for coincident 
reductions  in tax burdens and increases in  the money stock, however,  tha observed 
correlation between taxes and inflation is likely to remain positive.  Stabili- 
zation policy  in large part responds to shocks,  When exogenous factors cause a 
business slowdown, borh inflation and the share of  taxes in  GEP are likely  to 
decline)'6  If  the government responds with  a monetary expansion  accompanied by  a 
tax cut, the ratio of taxes to GNP will be  unambiguously lower than without the 
shock and associated stabilization.  Inflation will also be  lower, unless  the 
stabilization policy rote then offsets the disturbance  it was designed to 
correct)'7  The positive correlation  implied by  the deadweight-loss minimization 
above is therefore also characteristic of  stabilization-induced  variation. 
A second potential explanation  is that governments are unable  to adjust the 
structure of taxes frequently enough to  enforce the first order conditions 
implied by optimizing models.  This view is implicit in  the work  of  Feldstein 
(1983) and others who view  the effects of  inflation on  tax burdens as  largely 
accidental and  unanticipated.  Even when  tax rules are costly  to change, however, 
policy makers might be  able to implement the links between  taxes and inflation 
16Hollowsy  (1984) suggests that the elasticity of federal tax receipts aith 
respect to GNP is about 1.4.  A decline in output will therefore lead to a 
decline in the tax-to-GE?  ratio.  Given the progressivity of the income tax it 
will  also generally lower the average marginal tax rate. 
1'7The negative correlation between T/GNP  and inflation implied by 
stabilization policy could appear  in the data if a substantial  share of the 
policy variation was due to changing tastes on the  part of government.  Such 
variation is  predicted,  for example, by  models of  "political business cvc.es -  24  - 
described  above.  An  unindexed tax aystem which raises corporate  tax burdens 
during  inflationary periods because depreciation is based on  historic  cost, for 
example, generates a positive association between tax rates and inflation. 
A final possibility  is that the government's objective function  which  guides 
inflation and tax policy varies over  time.  This could explain our findings, 
regardless of  whether inflation is chosen on  the basis of  revenue or stabiliza- 
tion considerations.  The perceived  costs of  inflation and taxes may change with 
the political perty in  power,  shifts in  voter preferences, or changes in  the 
transactions or tax-collecting technology.8 Alesina and Sachs  (1988) provide 
aome support for the view  that different political parties in  the United  States 
have  different aacroeconomic preferences, and Hibbs (1986) doonments apparent 
variation  through time in  the inflation-unemployment preferences of the U.S. 
electorate.  If  governments that are willing to tolerate inflation  also like 
expansionary policies in general, then  total revenues will decline in  periods of 
high inflation, reinforcing the negative inflation-tax correlation.19 
The view  that negative inflation-tax correlations are due to unstable 
government  tastes is mildly supported by  the fact that countries with more stable 
governments  and less diverse political parties, such as postwar Japan  and the 
United States, exhibit positive tax-inflation correlstions.  Countries  with more 
political  instability, such as  Britain and France, tend to exhibit negative 
correlations.  Further work could usefully explore how political  institutions or 
18  .  . .  .  .  Berro's (1987) analysis allows preferences to  snift in  this wey since the 
government's preferred  intetcst rate changes over time. 
1SCne situstion that is reminiscent of  changing tastes arises when  govern- 
ments must  signal their type when there is an  election but not otherwise.  Rogoff 
and Sibert  (1988) model such time-varying preferences, but in  their model the 
correlation  between inflation and taxation is ambiguous. -  25  - 
other  aspects of  social structure are related to the inflation-tax correlation, 
The premise that governments raise revenue by equating the marginal 
deadweight losses  on different tax instruments can also be tested in other 
contexts.  Provided consumer tastes, production  parameters,  and the tax technol- 
ogy do  not vary auhatantilly  over rime, the marginal  deadweight lossea from  dif- 
ferent tax instruments should move together.  An increase in  one tax rate, due to 
increased spending, should raise the marginal deadweight burden  from that tax and 
lead to commensurate  creas'  in the efficiency costs of  other tax instruments 
(and hence  tax ratesj.  In protice, tax rates on different goods do not change 
in tandem.  The real exutse tax rate on  alcohol and cigarettee declined through- 
out the l970s and early llSOs, for example, whiie marginal tax rates on labor 
income increased.  Ballard, Shoven and 'w'halley (1985) document substantial 
disparities in  the mergiral efficiency costs of  different excise  taxes, sod 
between excise  and other taxes.  Reconciling these patterns of  tax burdens with 
oprimiming moods  of  governxr.'nt behavior is an  important challenge  to positive 
theories of fiscal poiiuv -  26  - 
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Aorendix:  Tax Dynamics Without Commitment or Direct  Bond  Taxation 
In an  equilibrium of the game between successive governments which cannot 
commit  to the path of  the money supply, the government must always be  indifferent 
between maintaining  the equilibrium  level of taxes and changing taxes by a slight 
amount.  Otherwise,  given the differentiability of  our problem,  the current 
government would change taxes.  By  raising taxes slightly today,  the government 
incurs a cost  h'(O). 
The reason such slight tax increases are not detrimental 
must  be that, in equilibrium, such a tax increase would  lead future governments 
to lower taxes.  This expected fall in taxes at,  say,  time t+j raises welfare by 
This appendix derives a dynamic relationship for taxes by developing 
this indifference between current and future taxes. 
We consider an  equilibrium  in which the contingent path for tax rates and 
inflation is 19r'r-lt  For simplicity, we  focus on  the case in  which  income 
is always unity  (therefore  — 0)  and  lc'(  )  is a constant.  We starr by  analyz- 
ing what  happens if the government at t raises its taxes slightly.  Individuals 
and firms will  rationally anticipate rhar taxes and inflation will  be lower in 
the future.  Current real money balances  therefore rise  while current nominal 
interest rates fall; if the Fisher effect holds, the real rate is unsffected.  In 




These changes causs the end of period  debt at 
t+l to differ from the level which would have prevailed  in the absence of the 
period t tax increase by: 
(Al)  db1 
— RdS 
-  [R 
-  F  /8  1](dm/dS) 
÷ m[d(P/P1)/d93 
- d6÷1. 
The government at t+l must  also be indifferent with  respect to small changes 
in  tax rates.  This means  that the present discounted value  of  the welfare costs 
from period  r+l forward must be  the same whether the government at t÷l levies -  29  - 
taxes  equal  to 9t÷l + d9+i (as would actually happen  if the government at  t 




(A2)  d91/dG 
— -  R  -  - 
Pr/P  11(dm/dS) 
+ m[d(P/P1)/dOJ. 
The tax rate given by (A2)  hss the festure that real debt at the end of  period 
t+l is the same as it would hsve  been  had the government at t not deviated from 
the equilibrium  path.  If the government at t+l imposed this tax,  then govern- 
ments after t+l would abide by the original equilibrium path. 
The indifference of the government at ti-i  enables us to compute the welfare 
consequences of tax changes at t by  pretending  that taxes at  t+l will be used to 
offset the period  t tax increaee,  This  computation yields  the total welfare 
effect of  a tax increase at t: 
(A3)  dW/d9  —  -  Eph' (9  + [R - P/P  ,}(dm/dG) 
-  m)d(P/P+1)/d9i} 
- Epv'(P/P1)[d(P/P1)/d9 
+ h'(9). 
The three tecra in  this expression represent  the cost of  the extra period  t 
taxee, the cost of  the extra t+l taxes under  the counterfactual  assumption  that 
taxes are given by (Al)  ,  and  the cost of  the increased inflation between t and 
t+i respectively. 
Using equation  (10) and the requirement  that government at  t must  be 
indifferent with respect to smaii changes in taxes (setting dW — 0  in  (A3)) we 
obtain: 
(A4)  h'(9) 
— pE[P.  + (R 
-  Pc/Pt+i)(dmt/detnh'(ot+i). 
Thia expresaron  is similar to the random  walk  expression  (12)  which obtains with 
conssitment,  but differa by inclusion of the term (kPt/Pt+i)(dmr/d9t).  This  tern 
is present because when  the government at t raises tsxes. agents expect  lower 
inflation and real money balances rise.  This increases government revenue, so 
taxes can fall  tomorrow by more  than R times the current tax increase.  Since tax -  30  - 
increases are associated with relatively  large tax reduction  tomorrow the 
deadweight burden of  taxes tomorrow must be low relative to  that given in (5);  in 
other words 
cRh'(e÷1) 
must  be below h'(9).  Still, for the special but not 
etonomically absurd case in whith  (R - P/P+1)(dm/de) 
is independent of  the 
rste of inflation (A4) implies thet taxes follow a martingale. 
Equation  (A4) requires that the expected change in  tax rates be  associated 
with expected  inflation.  High  rates of  inflation tend to be inefficient  so a low 
value for ttt+l  means  that the benefits  from raising real money balances by 
reducing expected inflation are high.  On the other hand, for plausible demand 
functions for money, the actual increase in  real money balances from  an  increase 
in taxes is smaller with  higher  inflation.LO  Stated  differently, whereas  the 
first term  of (P.  - 
P/F÷1)(d.m/dO 
)  always  rises with  expected inflation,  the 
aecond term may fall, making the effect of  inflation on  the difference between 
the left and right hand  sides of (P4)  ambiguous.  Nonetheless  it is worth 
studying whether the expected rate of  change of  taxes depends on the current 
expecetd rate of  inflation, as we do in Table 6. 
20This  is for instance the case if the demand  for money  is an 
exponential  function of  while hQ end v(.)  are also exponential 
functions. 